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Abstract of the paper
The provisions relating to some selected ite~P in the
1979 Nigerian Constitution have de~eterious economic cO:lsequen-
cies. The items are revenue allocation, creation of dtJ.tes,
Land Use Decree, the Council of Chiefs and Federal/State
appointments. In what follows in this paper the author deli-
neates these economic consequences specifying necessary
constitutional changes as palliatives to accommodate/solve
the problems as discerned. It was shown that the constitution
recognises directly only population and may be remotely school
enrollment as criteria for revenue sharing between pta"i~esK
It was further recommended that the provisions relating to
the Land Use Decree, Council of Chiefs, Federal/state appoint-
ments should be exptmged from the organic law as modcs of
accommodation to changing circumstances of state.
1 • llJTROWCTION
The 1979 consti tution o"f the Federal Republi c of Ni"geria ( 1)
is an organic or fundamental lavi which should grol.,r 1-rith time
as amendments are made to accommodate cham~ing circu~st~1cesK
The constitution derived from the activities of the Constitution
Drafting Committee (CDC) of 1975/76, the National Constituent
Assembly of 1978 and the Debates carried on by all Nigerians
through the mass m.edia. Thus the inputs towards the proQuction
=
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of this organic lavT are qui te encompassing of the Nigeri.,ano
intelligen t sia and 3.1 so the ryF~ing mi'.i tary oliga.rchy who made
sure the;, t Gome dec::KK~ees wert:: given cc !i.stitutional sanction and
that the collectivu Ivill of the peo )le as represented by the
output of the Constituent Assembly,ras vetted with minor
amendments he:1'e an.d there by the ruling Supreme Milt tary CoUncil.
pEu:~U dire c:conomi c co 1sequen( es resulting from the
Consti tution coulCi. :x; di scorned from the provi sions relating
to the following i terns: revenue allocation, creation of sta.tes,
the Land Usc Decree, the council of Chiefs, and Federal Minia-
te:cial appoil:.tments. It is pertinent to look at these provisions
and an8.1ys8 their economic consequences. The items are however
not exhaustive, but selective.
2. PLl2JVBHU3 ALLOCk:2ION
Section 149 s bsection of the Constitution stat€s tbat,
lPThe Federation shall maintain a spr3cial account to be call~d
"T e Federation Account ll into 'ibich shall be paid all revenues
collected b the Governmentoi the Federation except the proceeds
frot: the porsonal income t;"x of the personnel of tho armed
forces of the Fede"3.tion, the Nigerian Police Force, the Ministry
or' DepEJ,rtrr.(;n t of Government charged in th responsibili ty for
External Af,'airs and the r8sidents of the Federal Capital Terri-
tory" •
SUbs8ction 2 olso states "Any c.'llilount standing to the
credi t of the lede:D~PKtion Accolmt sholl be distributed among the
Federal [~nd state I}ov(,rnments and the Loco.1 Government councils
in each Btai~e on such terms and such manner as may be prescribed
.l...,. __•
The implication of t>lis subsection is that the National
Assembly could derive SOffie criteria for revenue distribution
behleen the CentrL o.nd thE; states. v'lhatever criteria that is
accepted by the National Assembly i~ taken as valid and consti-
tutional. It is ELf.: >UD1ed that no ot- cor provision in the Consti-
tution ti 8S dovm t.rli..: hands of the N,'l.tional As;,embly as to a
givGYl cri tcrio'l. 3evernl c:L'i teri[L ~lD~us have been evolved for
the allocation of revenUE) blPttE~en the centre and tho statelil.
Principles suell as cqu-cui ty of staGes (minimum responsi bili ty
of states), derivution, primary school enrolment, reverse school
enrolment9 t"l.X effortrl and ::Land mass have been brought into play~
In the past as much "l-S 50'/; of revenue has been distri buted
accoroing to the pri?l.ciple of equality of stat es.
Nobody has looked at the Constitution, :i.. ts message and
j.mplication to see hm! citi~cns of this large nation of states
should bo treated Ll the nevi dispensation. For instance is it
constitutional to ~llocate rcvE~ue on any principle outside of
population? Crul we sp~cify COl stitutionally any other principle
like lanaru8.ss, eq ue.li ty of JtE:' ~esI tax efforts, primary school
enrolment and not j nst popDg~K~d_ on?
The conteutio_. of this p8.p8r is that the constitution
recognises popnlatio> as the only cri tcrion for sharing revenue
betwE: n th8 Ce tr(] cu-td the statGs. My other fonnula can be
inj ected o'ly by cOll:3ti tu.tioncl 2.illCmdment. AI though the Funda-
mental Objectives an; Directi.ve Principles of state Policy section
of tho cor:ctittitioil is not justi.ciuble, but then as 3....Yl enunciation





Section 17 @u::-sectiO:l 2 (a) of ~he constitution an social
objectivus states :ic;vcry citizen pha~ have equality of rights~
obligations ar...d o[portw1iti os bLfor, the law". Thi s is an equal:. :~~?
principle, of the constitution. Al;() section 39 subsection 1
(a, b) proviG.es for right to f'reodo; from disormination on basj.s
of ethnic group, plc'.ce of o,:-igin, f 'n:, religion c~tcK The non-
discrimination provision en :mciate, che ,-,quality principle of the
constittl:; ion •
On the basi3 of this ~quality principle each individual
casts just one vote in any 3lection regardless of his uducation
his resource endoy~ent and ~us other capacities. Tho equality
o each individ\.w.ls righT-s, obligations and opportunities is
sanctionC'd by tho ccmsti tutionn In a situation where AncUIl bra
state for instancu··Ji th []. populati F~"l of about 5 million people
receives say rUO millj.on from t'le Federation Account through
any fonnulcc L;1 opcro.tion anrl Nj e:er state wi th a popUlation of
ab ut 1.5 million people r~Udj: os the same MIa million under
the S:JJIl.e fonnula, you can not 3Ciy that the equality principle
has bOEJrl met., ,juch an allo<;c' ion would be in flagrant violation
of the l'oL:vant s':"ictio .8 of te co,csti tution. Such an allocation
ca or,ly C)'J ;Prfz-D:;Oii~d by an 2.ffiendmen t to the constitution~
rco :-:iyotcc-C tLc; rigr,'-s of t~le indivldual within the context
of fisccu fedOralsi:I1~ the :DTincij)los of equality of individuals
is tho or:ly cri torion saYlct:e.oned by the constitution and this
should be applied to reverJUi.J distribution. The states are
not equal except ir: tGrms of protocol for state officers and
Chief execu.tivGs, tl18ro is ro fu.nctional equality. Land maSEl
his wolf:'-Lre ul timE', :;ely and not for an inanimate physical
quantity. School onrolment comes closor to the eql~lity
princj.ple sinco school children cO\1':_d serve as a proxy for
mlm1K1~I;ItionI ~DlIK 2.ctual quantity, os)(;cially Ttlhen population
figu:CC,J TO ofter: unrelL-:,')le. ThuE assuming a given equal
proportinn in prioJ,'.ry schools betvk'en m:Jtos, a state vTith 5
millior. 1)80plc 8.ctuu.l popLLla ti on dn ta and "Ii th 1 mjllion in
primar~;I sct'.ools, comparod to cmothcr state l-li th 2.5 milJ_ion
people vlOuld be eXl'octod tc havE: hD..lf n million primary school
children. CO:LlSOq ently the PKctlr~ figures of primary school
:onrolmont gc.:n'J rat eO. within' stat's should be taken as actuaJ.
proxios of t.l.LO fFlm~uCltion figu.ros. It 1-las on this account
that the a .thor recommcmd8d primary school enrolment as a
criterioI':. function .for revenue distri bution betVJC8n the centre
( 2)
and the states to the Okigbo R()vonuG 3.l1ocation COmr'1ission.
Tho ide vms novel El d it was th,.) authors original contribution
acceptud '..IitIl minoT moc1ifi ea tjJ)"ns, th:::\t is 'IU th re-,[t)rS8 enrolment
cri terion, 'by tho (\(iSbo mUK:~elK
As the author further argued j_n his submission to Oldgbo,
education has beem ccccoptod to hrl.V2 great interregional Gxterna-
liti es. A st2."':;\..; iE ~q ,sting .cughly in dl~cation 1iJollld benefit
the n tion Hi t:l 2.[1 enlichtened and educated i!Ork force available
to the l~lD 81' CCOl1UL'1y. Since t 1e stato cnnnot inti:rnalize all
extornali ties or be!1lJfi tf; aeeru<-.ble from investing in i~dueation
incentives shorld be; given to sti3.tes to bring out 100% of the
age cohorts in prim~ry schools into actual schooling. As Anderson
et. ale (1963)(3 found out 400 of primary school enrolment is a
threshold for economic development. Thus an inducement to
states to empho.r:Jisc school enrolment would help achieve
El, larger natiOlJo.l obj,-,ctive •
.,:.!,.ddi tionc'..l.ly prianry School enrolment could be used as
.n index of abS()l'ptivl; cf1.pacity, vlith states having high school
onrolemont being able to ~bsorb further inve3tment in other
sectors of her economy in response to tho economic forcus
Thus the economic c1)f1seqnence of the 1979 constitution
with respClct to a pToper revenue allocation formula is that
population and primary ~chool enrolment are the only reliable
ri teria for revenue distribution in Nigeria. The f::metic
and sometimes frivolous demands for states creation would
attenuate since theTc is no extra fi scal benefit to restructure
('Ir divide a given statf}. All rovenue ollocation formul~in use
in the pr~st in NiGGrio. Gi"(,, the impression that in is better
for a sta~U to be small r~ther than large. Large states are
YlGcossary because scale economies would be generated in the pro-
visi n of serviccs p in tho nclministration of the states location
of i~ldustridpI and provision of collectivG goods. The principle
of individu.::u' equc.li ty 1AJould protect subh large states.
Further in tho U.S.A. in'response to the princip£e of
individ nell equCili ty o.s qnshrinod in their constitution revenue
allocation ls ::.h stri butfjd 100% according to population. In that
co\.mtry thGre ~iK~Ktp b~~cn no demands for cruation of states, very
large stc.tes co-exi s-G with very small ones. Revenue and other
p.arquisi tes fro; thL contro nrc; distri butod according to population~




q~~s C~lifornia with ~ pl~ulation of 30 million people
and Nevada with J po' ulation of 6 million people would have
Cl ratio of 5: 1 ill any revenue allocation from the centre to
the stadgb;p~ lFle~ it then pay GalifprniQ to split into 5 statSs?~
The ap-s~ef is no. Their extra larUD~ness is prot8cted and nebulous,
~ne~a~tI ~mprediseI unfa~r an4 ~ne~uitable formulaes are not
brought into play to emasculate tbe equali ty of ind~_viduagKs
.- j I
as ~nshKl;~n~d in th relevant con~;itut~onK The author hereby
admon~sheS thr:j.t Nigl6na desists :tKoIr~~th-from protecting woa.;LJ
atates, and thts enoouraging flITth8r redistribution of the oountry
iJ;lto smaller 1),..>J.vi2.ble e ti ties. ~~ long as iigel'1u,-oontiJiue,a tQ
protect small states and encourag, smallness in size of states
would remain a weak, Utid. uvaloped kK-~tl:KoKn and the fi ssiparioua
and centrifugal propensities .1.nherent in the 8€i tation tQ1!
states WGuld forev divide t~e Nigerian p~opleK
(3) CRZhTION OF pq~qbp
I
Section. 8 (1) of tho 1979 Constitution stipulates the
procddrl~c for the crd~tion 5f more states in Nigeria. The
section requiros the fc;lloy!d~ proees50s:
() two thi:r"s n'ljority of mombcr~ representing the area in
the Senate _nee HOuse t1f Representa ti vers, Stato Houses ot
)..sS0ffibl;:,' and LoC8.l Goyernment Council s would make a :reQ,l-lest
for such a State,
8.
(b) Tris'rTould ho.ve to be approved by 2/3 majority of eligible
'!(Jt ers or ;'>.ctuEl.l vote s cast in 0.. rcfcrend urn adminstered
to the pec:pl, of the area,
(c) The :c>Jsul t of thQ 3,bcYIJ(;; refercmdUIil is approved by a simple
l'Jajority of all t}lO States of tho Federation may be also
vcting il at EF-~hcr l'ofercl1.dw..,. arld a simple majority of members
of t 1e Houser:.) of!\.::3sembly and,
(d) This ~DqcDg~c1 aJ .so :cc coi vc the final approval 0 f 2/3 maj ority
of :JQODC'8 of each Houses of the National Asse!aKbly~
In"pitc cf the imprecise ~md rigorious nnture of these
provisicI~:Ks vll:i·-;h cE-~:rDC r1.8.d·3 to frustrate any further demo.nds
for states in 2' j_~eqia nore th~m 52 such demands he:. ve been made
ir. the fi rat t-,IO ex.,' hcQ f YC-;[;.I'S of the 2nd Republic the exact
pc::'icd of experir;ientation wi th the Republican Constitution~ ME~r
of th'seJ.elli::Lds ;'e frivol~FiDKsI but responsible ~DbK-cKiaw;; an'
redou.btaole 1~adelD;P in the grass oots level have led such demClY' '
fEF}K~ such states. If left untrammelled more than 100 demands
".;auld be mO~de h~fcDqDl; the cxpiratj_on of the first tfJTI':'l of office
cif the: 2T.'.d BKep"D~lKic~ Hhat thJ_s ta...Yltarnoilllts to is that each
SC:Ilat,)rL 1 Dist:cict ~Dflllld ':"]C'iuest for statal rl.-cogni tion so thpKg~
pcrllaps r"PKC~1 senate::..' of tho second Republic wOl.ld translate
to the p,-'si tion of Q:;:eclJ,tive GO'J(,;rl1or of a. state.
It is ~rwD_1KKdd by tho prc·ItI--KKgoni~gts for states creation that
more Sto.+.8S uOi.lcl lead tc even E1ev~iopr:lcnt of the national econODpr
India 1tTith a r'UIJul'.tJ_O:i:l of 0"1/ r 500 million people has only




Nobody has asked for tras large state which has an
equivalent popluatj_un of Nigeri8. to be split into 50 other
states foY thu purpose of development.
u. S.A•. '.vi th 8. populFltion of 250 million people has 50 stat es,
the la.t"gest st::-gKtc;;~~ Calif(Jl11ia and N8vT York have about 30 million
paople or'..ch. Furth<-T in tho U.S. Constitution there is no
p:rovisioE for tho crjation c"f st8.tes altholgh in 200 years
of thoir dstory +;hG,-f grc-",. from 13 states to 50 by acquisition
and cession of neVI terri teo-ries, not by devolution of pOl/Tcrs
~nthin eXisting bounQari s.
It is ~lso v8ry doubtful that creation of states would
lead to even d 0'1 ,;1 opr.-tont. Growth and clovel opmentis a function
of capital and invostocnt. Capital ffild investment are flillctions
of saVings and inco, o. Income and savings are functions of
proc_uctivi ty. Proci,,-ctivi ty is a function of capi taJ.. Thus we
can be enmoshed in:', vicious circle that could lec.d us propul-
sively to heaven 01' send us dOl'.rrl belovT to the depts of proverty
in perpl:tui ty depE;nc~ine: on our initial capital endowmollt ~ As
we create more statos WG roduce the capacity for the states to
save and invGst. states capitO~ proceeds are constantly
virGd to moet thl.' llr:; ;:ls of spiralling recu.rrent charges. How
then can '.'TC devolol) "Hithout capitcu? Or is development merely
the building of neT/! hOusos, States HCEldquQrt'cTs and so on? How




Aru vie not likely to be creatine: eXCGSS ca.paci t} \<d. th
hi.gh costs of pro'vision of government services through dupl:i r
tion and 'i'Taste? Is this not a case of monopolistic: cCglpet~t:~
in Gc:vGrnment serl;/ices Hi tll. high C03t of productioYl 7 duplj_co..-',
and waste_? Thnre c::.re many i~clivisDbili ties in Goverr1Ill8nt
services requiring large scale proe'.uction so that one benefi ts
from ecoEcf:1ies of 8 cale of provi siol:'. of these servicesD~ These
indivisibilities do 2xist in the provision of services especiall~-
in administratic:J.r in lecation of industries and in the provisiCl'
of collective goods. Thus as a result of the above it is fi tti]
to state th-;,t the greater the number of states af€§ ':" [ gi' ':1.
alaximi~KI the 101-Jer the cav:ci ty for economic gro\<rtt O,nl do-,
J::18nt since scale economies s.n; vi tiat,--'d o..nd capitccu is depJ.c ~
Helve we then reached tht:; optir::1ID numbGr of st3.te 3 in
criteria. It is l)ussible thC'.t ~iqU hav8 exceeded the op.;im 1-·
in tl1rD.S of the oconomic fo.ctn-rs since the present 19 DPtatc~
all depend or- Lagos to bU~anc: their respe ctive bud ~et ~ ..
Is there then stiL any n8ecl;0 create more states? Tl.e
answer could be rl~clitive or:ly for sociological and )01:', ti ccl
accoIJl.Qodati'n butvruen the ve.rious groups in Nig\:.:ria" The
number of nddi tionnl states shoLUd thus be kept as _lOvT as
possible say bet"Teem 5 and 10 as wlximum•
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Thus the CCl ;Jrr:ic consequence of this p~viKKsiKKnmK in the
r igerian constitution is 8. feverish and unquestioning demand
for Llc:re s'w.tes whi en if ereated as 1 em and ed Hould vIm ttle
down E~DIvclopccnt in~:rcead of e,lhc,ncirg it. This provision
is rdcofai~enddn f r Jeletion after new states wust have
beerJ- cTea-r;ed to elii:L ate fLl·ther c1e[l~KndDj after the current
uxercise.. 1->' lv::; of r:.sources and energies \"mch have
Ctl'krne.ti ire IL'sitive UsE:::S in the economy are 'I.'lasted in demands
fer state, a si tlAKtK"Il~iEFn which cannot be said to be in the
cliruction of poKKiD~to optinali ty since the costs outweigh potentiGll
oc:ncfi ts ho, evur cr.lculc::.ted. (4)
The relevant l.rov j_sion in the eonsti tution on land use is
ceeti on 27 4 subs~ction 5 (d) "kotlD~ng in the cor~stituti<:)U,~
invalidate thG L nel Use DGc:-cee of 1978 and the provisions
of this enact ent s~~ll CO:ltj_l1UC to apply and have full effeot
in o.ceordcmce with thuir ·~tK;nKogKD and to the like extent as any
othur previsions fo:rming PD,J:.·t )f this Constitution and shall
not be alter :d C:L" repe ed except in accordance with the provisions
of sectirJn 9 (2) of this constitution;! The Supreme Nilitary
Council VIi th the <':'.!)()VO provision gavt::: COl. sti tutional sanction
to the Land Usa DOC;:'80 of 1978.
The Land 0se D'Jcree tr8.nsfGrr,d all land rights to the
states, so that trs.ns2.ctjJ:i1S 01':' land would be by state and th8
local government 8 alloca tiOll for approved uses rather than by sale
in 1311(1, Darkets. (5) The all\.)cati ve effect of the price mechanism
'das supcrceduu b:Jr state :Ln f:lvour of rati n'ng of avnilci.ble spaces
oatsi~ie of tho m~lKKrlcut I:1ucharLisLl.
As Or:otunde ~D~voKn Geo:'C7'e JcnnSOn10,s shown, a land tenure
systCf:l f~Kcilitates inCreaSiJ3 in "\-lea] Gn "Then (a) property rights
a _G prcp:,rl;y- defined 1di th l.;gal and -:;enure certainty and (b) theEe
is ;'frc8G. r,. a~lEi g_MC~l cmfEDq~emKent 0:,. contracts" \'1"hen these do
i10t fDu:K~ve llhysico.ll.:,.- h0.1'cf\)J. effect2 C' _ o~tsiders for vThich the
cuntr_cting pc.rti 08 are n,'t ma,;(.; tc QOLlpenSa tee (6)
FU.::cthor John:--;on has 810lVfl the, the lugal ond -cenure
.l:n his a:;alysis, the; uncertainties c~erive from
thr) teCldC~lCv f,Jr le. \'1 enfcrc;ment agents to uphold Cllf1tc,mary law
against i-1divj d~lal ':'i->ffi rs}'>J..:) of' laCld, the non-s;Jecii.'j. c:~ ty of
propsrty :cj.ght f3 IIi -th 1 egal ~DInd teYlure c,.:ctainty $ th:; rl~writt en
no. .uTe of 1"'.\'18 :::mC. contract:) and. the inconststc)j:cieH in admini-
strative :::m:}. ju::licio:,l decis_ons.
HoI': has the YigGria L; -nd J se Decree taken car" of these
pr:'blc-js T.d adherucl to the t\'J( fold cri tcria for wealth
naxici""ation in t~lC agricul -ID~~-: l s,;ctor 'ala Johnson7 Goverlliilent
by t..'1.king OVt:r rigL·'.g to Inr.d las reduced logal and tenure
curtai:n.tios froLl tiLG hands (f individuals \'Tho could hoJ d such
since Gov ,rnnents E>_v~l chang\. 2.11[1 rights r'aIl thus be revoked and
transfcrrc~dKK Hith 3uch uncertaintios c~bout rights on Jand,
investoen's s in a:K!ll~ -CKI~t::::KKchecl to lC1.11c1 arc- likely to a tt er ua te and
the valUG of 12nd furthur r,;Lluced bolc;\'T the zero prj ce consequent
on statu ~llocatiu~~
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Further tiL fr,-:odom al1d 1 gal enforcement cri tenon cannot
hold \'lith state allocC1.tioi':'. The inc'j_viclual can no longer
transfer l8.ncJ rights to oth8rs ,;,d. tL resources to develope such
land. The state vToiJ.ld have to cone in at all stages of such
transfers Tid th nec,-;sso.ry o.p:,Jrovc'.ls ~_md 2.uthorisations.. Such
state intervontion WJlJ.ld roduce the volt1l1e of transactions on
land and in colL3c;Q 1 .()YlcC: 10,;,/)r the value of land.
The Nig,;ricUl land uso decree has not taken caTe of the
probleL1s ancJ.ysed by Johnso:'l. Individual mmership is not
protected in a syst:)r:.: vrhere land rights can be revoked at will
as this is "Ii thin the COffilJe-cenco of changing governr,lGntaJ.
authori tic s. mlK~yFrFEF:;:Dty righ-,s cannot bo rr,acle specifi c, p ennanent
and perpetual. iOnI~iK v<::.l ues are not taken into consideration in
any exchange a~lt hC'::":L ~y:Icl by goverllii1ent since the land decree only
recognises vI"~ue of inv8stDlcnts in and attached to land and not
land itself ..
Land is an cae-noDic r(;source and as such must have value~
~lKny sU.p';Tcession O.L' th8 price nech nism in the allocation of
land vToLU;l lead t: ;istorti( ns in the economy.' Land would not be
a,lloca-sed te, it::, ··-_I:l"~st valued uses in .?, syst(;[ll that does not
r::K:cog:r~iPE; Lmd. -j::"~uI;sKK The si tuc:..tion. is thus non-pareto optimal.
Tlw uncortc.'inti)s i~crc:D" 3: tro.nsactions cost and in consequence
sr.tOLld l(l[c:(' t}lU v:K11K~M of L:nd. Further if the cost of est2"blish-
iU8 ccrtain.ty 1 S ;)T . ~::KKKiK b:L D~:i va scme le.nds wou.ld be unallocated to a:ny
Usc' civing ri::~D"F i;;n the pllCllC r:'; enOl of i'lanu su_rpl us II and "labour (7)
SU.I'iJ J..U.2" tgKl~:d '.co 'ften as~c! -tn clescribe the Nigorian situation~
g:"~ :--Ij ['le--: -i:;~lKbD 8.ut.hor ha::-:\ 8hm.Tn in his pap8l'S 'lOp timal. Farm
Sizes Under aiffe~ceat Tenure arrangements!I(e) and HA comparison
of Comrr:QYJ.al, Freehold and Leasehold Land Tenu.re: A Pre) 1m; nary
study in Ibadan and. lfe, \lestern Nj.geria it ( 9) the in:r'eriori ty of
state allocations '/is-a-vis individu.al :eights on land in ther
agricul tural fJ8ctor of the Nigerian economy. Land tenure problEms
are institU-'::iona.+ and state o\'men3hip compounds rather than
alleviKaK~c;s tl:'GD. state intervention should be in the direction
of moa.er&tir..g or eliminating thE; insti -ell tional practice that tend
to supercede the rl'?irket mechanism, not to ctmpound the practices
by a blanket tota.l supercession of land markets. In this vain,
the Land Use .Jecroi;' is a good candidate for deletion from the
consti tu_ti o:D~ to 1'8('..lloe or eliminate the dire economic consequences
as ShO\vD a Dove.
5. ~D1DAflyCv AND lVIIl;I;:3T.;.:;n.IAL AFrO INTMENTS
The constith~ion in section 178 (1) makes provision for s
Councjl of C.lliefs ::.!l 80.ch state. Further section 140( 1) (a)
provides fOT a lifati.onal Council of state which as xplained in
the third. schcdt;le part section 1 (i) shall comprise rtone pElrson
from Ez;-~Kch 8'ca to l:fho sha12. as respect s too t state be appointed
by the COc1J.lcil 01' C~}iefs of tnG state from among themselveslt~
Wi th th8 q~:Itionaliz;1Ktion of poli tical autho1'i ty in a
republiczm. Cl~lUtiK i.,:ltion onu T:,rou.lCl. expect that chieftaincy and
other paTapharnelli of traditional authori ty vTould l' ceive
no constj tl1tj.OYlal s<:u·lction. Chi eftaii1cy vTaS indeed a mori bund
institution befo~e the last military regime marked it out for
recogni tion a a v.Tay of legi timjzing their authority. Thus under
)1
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the "Tatchful eyes of the last military ~meI traditional authority
was given racogni tioD in a ratiOl al consti tutional document. Republic-
anism recogni es a thori~g deriving from the people through the
procesGQ of rationCll s lection a d not traditional legitimation,
thus the pro~ isions or chieftaincy in the Nigerian constitution
are inconsistl::~1Kt ·Ii th the said rep blican orientation of t e
constitution. (10)
In Ansmbra 8tate al_one more than 50 chiefs ha e bee given
state recognition as a 1'0 ut of the provision. In fm~ state,
the same number hav~ roared up their heads and at ai ed State
recognitioL. qhn~o is a plan to pay salaries to these chiefs
in the Igbo st~" tes. II the ten northern. states and five W stern
States, such p,..ymants a::o ait accorn lie Further these chiefs
with vcr'-' large onslj~lllds and retinues are 1'fastef in expendi ture-.
Extensive tribut s c~Kre often colJ. ted from their subject for
chieftaincy titles and ann al chieftaincy fostivit"es which in
eac ...:. instance co~ sumes many thousand s of naira.
Chioftaincy is indeed a duplication of rational political
authority Qnd tho osts of maint~ining a parall 1 a thority
is a dUl1lication nrrJ wustG of rusourcos. Chieftaincy is most
likel' to le.!"Ld to cor spicuous. consumption and the depletion of
capital in a ccpitul s a e economy and in consequence 10 lering
th Nations c~pblcity for realising higher ates of economi 0 rowt
and devulo mont. T l' hieft, i cy provisions in our con ti tution
are fit and p oper candidates for delotion so that the in titution
could be aided to a n:1.tural eath.
10.
The :Prusident is empowered unde"!' sect.ion l}5-(3} -af "the--
constitution to apl>oj_l1t Cl "PJlinister from e ch state of the
Fed8r&tion. Sections 14(3) & (4) of the constitution also
rovidcd for the reflection of the Federal character and state
diversity in all Federal, St- to ctppointmonts.
For instance in th centr there: (lrc 45 ministerial
appointments a _d..LJ sorro st t ·s ministerial (Commissioner) plp~dp
of as high as 20 L. u1J.mber havo been created. Posts are creat<3d
not to satisfy the needs of the state but to satisfy varying
geographi caJ_ areas. Jl...nd gi '/8n the Pary..insonian/Wagnerian law
of ever incrc~silg state nctivity th~re is no limit to the
creation of these ]Josts.
Govcrrwont u.s '.re law,·, comprises the executi ve the legi s--
lative a~d the judiciary arms. Only the logislature is a
represen tati VCJ b UI;-~ch of GOVi)rnm 8n t 'vIhi ch should 1'efl ct the
va ~orD-D 81:12..dos and di veroi tics of puopJ_o I,Ti thin a gi ven state
or Nation. Tho exocutiv0 and Judiciary need not rGflect
dive:rsi ty sin 0 it is vi,ry costly to so orientate the people~
It is very costly b~causc i~ trying to ma:e every sector of
the Gover ~Imt rC}Jr::scntc.tivc, you ar;) bound to BVate more
and [iOra loaple: to .i'osi tior. whurc they cannot perform optimally
in a given c~I~signdc:~~t and where their rmmrds are fa greater
than their contribution lGading to depletion of state funds in
mo.i ltClining v\jry h..i;h ro urr nt charges.
1'( •
The conseq' enccs of these provisi ons is tha.t lJigsrj a i s
the only c untry ill. the world who' e the executive, the legislati vc
and judici~ry arms of government nrc all representative bodies and
as such c.re extra. large leading to unduely high costs of adminis-
tration. For exar.1plo Hi eria a cOlmtry of 90 million people and
19 states has a For cral Gall rnment of 45 ministers, the U ..S. a
country of 250 mil].i:on peoplo and 50 stD.;J os has a FedQral Govern-
ment of 13 minist~xsK
6. OOlTCLU,:!IOnS: Rev.;nue should be distributed according to
population cmd primary school enrolment. The equality of states
principle is the Jrimary cause of the demand for states. As high
as 505.;- of thl; J:t\;deration Accolmt has been spli t in tlLi.s way giving
undue advantages to small states and thus fueling the demands for
more stat es.
The provisions for the creation of states though rigO,l.·(H1S
and imprcci se did not as was thou.ght frustrate the demand for
statt-"s .. The e:.tgitation is frenGtic, frantic and feverish and
if left illltrammollci could vscclnta into violence wld pitched
battles. Yet creation of marl') states can only reduce our capC3.ci ty
for 3.ttaining c:csirc!!JJ_e levels of economic growth and development
since our capital r0sources attonuate as we maintain very high
recurrent chargss t : these stat8s. Even development can be attained.
by a more judicious location of industrie and collective goods
"!trhi ch can be more 0conornicalJ y and effi ci ently prOVided for in
larger than smaller states.
•The land se Decree transf.ers la.nd rights to the atatea
and Local Gov rnments who then by means of rationing of availa bJ_
spaces suporcade the market mechanism for sale of land. It has
b0en shown that state allocation is an inferior sol tion to the
problE:IO.s of land usage in both the agricultural and urban sectore
of the Nigeriun Econony.
The provisions for chieftaincy institutions by giving
consti tutio>l8.l sDnctior to a mari bund institution creates a
parall""}l tT8::i tiono.l auth ri ty to the rational republican
a th rity. This is seen ~s economic waste and dupliaation~
Chieftaincy l'r.'J.ctices a di tionally lead to conspicuous consUIDpti"·
and the depletion of cap·tal~
The provisions for the reflection of the Federal character
iE all Fed0ral ~pp intnents and state character or diversities
in 0.11 stat8 c.ppointments have led to the creation of a cornucop::L'
a c:xecu.tive posi ti ns in order to sati sfy all geogral)hical un:i.
Merit is supGrce led for geography in all appointments and as she-
this is in~:fficient o.nd very costly. The legislature vThich is
a valid ,-:rn of Gov, !'nment has taken care of so cial di versi ti s
and ceder~l ch?rac r~:C .. The Gxucutiv8 and judiciary arms of GOVfJrnD'·
a e not rc:prr:sen.t:::d;iv0 bor ies any ','There in the \vorld except NigeriJl,
It is hoped t J.:"" I;it~:KK timfJ and 'soonest if po sible thesG provisionc'
" auld give way :Lor l~l (3 rational l)rovisions through the instrwnen-
tali ty of canst.· tt ...tional amendmQnts since the fund &1 ental and
organic law is ~PtyK;Fjc;ct to such chang s as modes of accommodation
to c}~ngi circUDstances f stntet~
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